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State Ownership and the United Nations
Business and Human Rights Agenda: Three
Instruments, Three Narratives
MIKKO RAJAvuORI*
ABSTRACT

The rise of globally-oriented state ownership has emerged as a
crucial issue across political, economic, and legal planes during the past
decade. Contrary to the traditional approach where state ownership is
viewed primarily through trade law, antitrust law, and corporate law,
this article discusses the proliferating state shareholder power in
relation to international human rights law. In particular, the article
interrogates three recent U.N. human rights governance instruments by
using narratives that highlight perils, potential, and specialty of state
ownership in the emerging business and human rights agenda. It is
argued that the U.N. instruments realize the changes in the
architecture of globalized state ownership, portray it as a regulatory
space, and seek to utilize this space by recalibrating states' private
shareholder identities with public ends. At the same time, however, the
nascent human rights-based regulation of state ownership exposes a
of
the techniques
underpinning
deeper market contingency
contemporary human rights governance.
INTRODUCTION: STATE OWNERSHIP AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The rise of globally-oriented state ownership has emerged as a
crucial issue across political, economic, and legal planes during the past
decade. Marked by examples as diverse as the Chinese "Going Out"
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strategy,1 the rise of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the emerging
economies, 2 and the bailouts in the United States and in the Eurozone, 3
state ownership is increasingly understood as a vital tool in
contemporary economic governance. As a natural response to the
proliferating state shareholder power, a complex regulatory web
encompassing trade law, investment law, corporate law, and antitrust
law has developed. Historically, human rights law has mostly been
absent from the regulatory palette curtailing the state shareholder
power. However, as state ownership goes global, be it through foreign
direct investment (FDI) of a state-owned enterprise (SOE) or a portfolio
investment by a SWF, it is increasingly exposed to the demands rising
from the international human rights system.
This article discusses state ownership as a space for human rights
governance. As state ownership structures have become more
international
and
more
powerful, the
market-driven
legal
underpinnings of the regulation of state ownership are increasingly
augmented with human-rights-based regulatory rationales. Taking this
insight as its starting point, the article reviews three recent U.N.
human rights governance instruments: the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, implementing the "Protect,
Respect and Remedy" framework; the Committee of the Rights of the
Child General Comment No. 16; and the U.N. Global Compact's Human
Rights and Business Dilemmas Forum's treatment of SOEs. The article
unfolds by interrogating three narratives that are used to couple state
ownership with human rights across legal and policy discourses. 4 These
narratives, which I call the peril narrative, the potential narrative, and
the specialty narrative, lay down key parameters for understanding
state ownership as a site for human rights governance and help to bring
1. See, e.g., NARGIZA SALIDJANOVA, GOING OUT: AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA'S OUTWARD
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC & SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION
STAFF RESEARCH REPORT 1-4 (2011), available at http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/GoingOut.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Diego L6pez, THE MAJOR ROLE OF SOVEREIGN INVESTORS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 2-3 (2015), available at https:/www.pwc.com/gx/en/
sovereign-wealth-investment-funds/publications/assetsmajor-role-of-sovereign-investorsin-the-global-economy.pdf.
3. See, e.g., St6phanie Marie Stolz & Michael Wedow, EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES IN
EXTRAORDINARY TIMES - PUBLIC MEASURES IN SUPPORT OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN THE
EU AND THE UNITED STATES EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES NO.

117 7-16 (2010), availableat https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocpll7.pdf.
4. This article focuses on the U.N. human rights governance instruments. For an
analysis of international human rights jurisprudence touching on state ownership, see
Mikko Rajavuori, How Should States Own? Heinisch v. Germany and the Emergence of
Human Rights-Sensitive State Ownership Function, 26 EUR. J. INT'L L. 727, 729-37, 74145 (2015).
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the business and human rights enterprise into the context of the
existing structures regulating state ownership.
Ultimately, a detailed reading of the instruments suggests that the
U.N. experience with state ownership takes a functional, marketoriented form that shares many core positions, policy prescriptions, and
regulatory interventions developed in the course of privatization.
Nevertheless, by defining modern state ownership policies on their own
terms, the U.N. human rights system attempts to reclaim globalized
and financialized markets as a regulatory space in the pursuit of
economic justice. As such, the lessons of state ownership reveal an
attempt by the U.N. human rights system to assume a more central role
in the future of economic governance. Further, as the U.N. experience
builds, by and large, on traditional distinctions between public and
private identities in state ownership policies, it suggests a vision where
the regulatory subjectivity of the state operates primarily by imprinting
public ends onto private governance arrangements. Therefore, the
treatment of state ownership also exposes a deeper market contingency
underpinning the techniques of contemporary human rights governance.
Part I gives a brief account of the new rise of state ownership. Part
II introduces three narratives connecting state ownership and human
rights. Part III uses this narrative typology to interrogate three
contemporary U.N. human rights governance instruments. The
Conclusion discusses the lessons of connecting state ownership with
human rights.
I. THE REINVENTION OF STATE OWNERSHIP

This section describes the rise of new modes of state ownership. It
illustrates the strengthened position that state shareholders have
assumed in the global economy and the new institutional variations of
state ownership-often discussed with reference to state capitalism.
These changes are then briefly contrasted with the existing regulatory
responses aimed to manage the relationship between state shareholders
and investee companies. This section then suggests that the rise of state
ownership provides a discursive space for revisiting the underpinnings
of the current regulatory structure and the overall conception of state
shareholder power in the global economy, particularly when viewed
from the perspective of human rights.
A. The New Rise of State Ownership
For the past four decades, most policy and regulatory interventions
targeting state ownership have operated under a paradigm defined by
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liberalization and privatization. Grounded in the critiques mounted
against state ownership since the 1970s, the "common sense" approach
has remained suspicious of states intervening heavily in the economy
both as regulators and direct shareholders.5 These policies have
emphasized a variety of faults inherent in state ownership, such as
efficiency losses traceable to weak internal governance and dominant
market positions. 6 As a remedy, the dominant regulatory architecture
has emphasized the separation of a state's regulatory function and its
7
shareholder function.
At least since the global financial crisis started to unfold in 2008,
however, the realities and implications of state ownership have been
discussed in a new, more careful register. 8 Following the worldwide
bailouts of key financial companies and the capital injected into the
world economy by SWFs,9 heavy-handed state intervention was, at least
for the moment, suddenly a legitimate course of economic policy.
Ranging from SWFs effectively rescuing the Western banking system
with stock purchases and recapitalizations surpassing $90 billion
between July 2005 and October 2008 to the nationalizations of financial
powerhouses on both sides of the Atlantic, 10 the interventions did not,
however, materialize out of thin air. Instead, the rescue measures were
indicative of a much more constitutive change in the global economy:
the new rise of state ownership--often discussed with direct reference to
emergent state capitalism."
5. The term "common sense" is derived from David Kennedy, The '"Rule of Law,"
Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 95 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
6. For a concise summary, see Daniel M. Shapiro & Steven Globerman, The
International Activities and Impacts of State-Owned Enterprises, in SOVEREIGN
INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND POLICY REACTIONS 98, 114-25 (Karl P. Sauvant, et al. eds.,
2012).
7. See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], OECD
Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 12 (2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceofstateownedenterprises/3480321 L.pdf.
8. See, e.g., John Plender, The Return of the State: How Government is Back at the
Heart of Economic Life, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2008, at 1. For an insightful analysis from
the pespective of innovation economics, see MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL
STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 15-28 (rev. ed. 2014).
9. William L. Megginson et al., Determinantsof Sovereign Wealth Fund Cross-Border
Investments, 48 FIN. REV. 539, 540 (2013).
10. Id.
11. In this article, the term "state capitalism" is used as a shorthand expression for
increased global significance of state shareholders. Consequently, the use of the term
differs slightly from the most prevalent notion where "state capitalism" is usually often
discussed with relation to economic policies pursued by BRIC countries, particularly
China. See, e.g., Ming Du, When China's National Champions Go Global: Nothing To Fear
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Led by strong emerging economies, but also followed by other
governments regardless of developmental status or their location on the
North-South or the East-West axis, state capitalism has seen states
assuming strong shareholder positions in companies operating globally.
According to recent statistics, nearly 20 percent of the world's top 100
and over 10 percent of the top 2,000 publicly traded multinational
corporations (MNCs) are partially state-owned. 12 Their combined FDI
amounts to roughly 11 percent of the global FDI flows, and they
command more than $2 trillion in foreign assets. 13 Organizationally,
revitalized international state ownership is mostly channeled through
SOEs, often known as "national
streamlined multinational
champions."'14 However, the institutional structures sustaining modern
state ownership are more varied. SWFs, for example, have emerged as
an important minority shareholder group, with their assets growing
faster than those of any other institutional investors. Recent estimates
suggest that up to 25 percent of listed European companies have SWF
shareholders. 15 Further, the scope and geography of SWF investments
are growing, as new areas, such as sub-Saharan Africa, and new
industry sectors are targeted by sovereign investment. 16 Finally, as an
illustrative example of the overall rise of state ownership, over the
period of 2001-2012, governments around the world acquired more
assets through stock purchases than they sold through privatizations
and direct sales. 17 In sum, by bolstering their shareholder positions,
8
states have strengthened their control over various economic actors.'
Fifteen years ago, state-owned entities were absent from the lists
but Fear Itself?, 48 J. WORLD TRADE 1127, 1129-38 (2014); see also The Rise of State
Capitalism, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2012, at 11 (discussing problems from state-directed
capitalism in the BRIC context).
12. Przemyslaw Kowalski et al., STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: TRADE EFFECTS AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 6 (OECD, Trade Policy Papers No. 147, 2013), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk71-en.
13. United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment Report
2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, xviii, 19-22 (2014), available at
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD 2014].
14. See generally Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra et al., Governments as Owners: State-Owned
MultinationalCompanies, 45 J. INT'L. Bus. STUD. 919, 921-25 (2014).
15. UNCTAD 2014, supra note 13, at 19.
16. See id.
17. William L. Megginson & Veljko Fotak, Rise of the Fiduciary State: A Survey of
Sovereign Wealth Fund Research, 29 J. ECON. SuRv. 733, 734 (2015).
18. It should be noted that, according to most recent data, the internationalization of
SOEs seems to be decelerating. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming
International Investment Governance 17 (2015), available at http://unctad.org/en]
PublicationsLibrary/wir20l5_en.pdf, see also State Capitalism in the Dock; GovernmentControlled Firms,ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 2014, at 57-58 (discussing the poor performance of
SOEs).
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ranking the world's top firms. Now, they dominate the Forbes listings. 19
B. State Ownership in Context
Naturally, there is nothing new in states intervening in the
economy, either as regulators or as market participants. 20 On the
contrary, the interplay between private and public ownership on the
domestic level, or between protectionism and free trade on the
international level, constitutes a significant part of modern politics and
international relations. 21 As much of the contemporary discussion has
opted for the lens of "state capitalism," the following account also
positions state ownership in the framework of three generations, or
waves, of state capitalism.
The first wave of state capitalism, between the mid-nineteenth
century and the 1920s, was characterized by trade protectionism and
the development of the domestic industry by tariffs and supported by
the establishment of various infrastructures such as central banks. 22 By
contrast, the second wave, following the Great Depression and the
Second World War, introduced many facets that continue to dominate
the discourse on state ownership today. 23 In this phase, which also
spanned the socialist experience and the emergence of the East Asian
developmental states, governments often nationalized national
infrastructure and strategically important companies but also extended
their reach beyond public services by assuming entrepreneurial roles in

19. See FORBES, The World's Biggest Public Companies, http://www.forbes.com/
global2000/list/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2015) (listing Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, and Bank of China within
the top five).
20. For a succinct introduction, see Ian Thynne, Ownership as an Instrument of Policy
and Understandingin the Public Sphere: Trends and Research Agenda, 32 POL'Y STUDS.
183, 184-91 (2011).
21. See generally Pier Angelo Toninelli, The Rise and Fall of Public Enterprise: The
Framework, in THE RISE AND FALL OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN WORLD

3 (Pier Angelo Toninelli ed., 2000) (contextualizing the development of public enterprise in
historical perspective); Larry CatA Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global
Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese
Experience, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (2010) (examining the role of SOEs
since the financial crises of 2007).
22. See Andreas N6lke, Introduction: Toward State Capitalism 3.0, in MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS FROM EMERGING MARKETS: STATE CAPITALISM 3.0 1, 3-6 (Andreas N6lke

ed., 2014).
23. See ALDO MUSACCHIO & SERGIO G. LAzzARINI, REINVENTING STATE CAPITALISM:

LEVIATHAN IN BUSINESS, BRAZIL AND BEYOND 25-36 (2014); Louis Galambos & William
Baumol, Conclusion: Schumpeter Revisited, in THE RISE AND FALL OF STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN WORLD, supranote 21, at 303, 305.
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24
Further, domestic
various manufacturing and services sectors.
companies were sheltered from competition, and different units of
government actively managed business activities. In sum, this model
emphasized the inherent potential of patient state capital in correcting
market failures and spurring development for the benefit of the
25
domestic economy.
The central tenet of the current, third wave of state capitalism, on
the other hand, is the variety of formal and informal cooperative
relationships between various public authorities and individual
companies. 26 Direct shareholder control over corporate entities is a
natural facet of these cooperative relationships. While both the second
and the third wave of state capitalism center on state ownership of
firms, the forms and modes of ownership preferred in these eras differ
considerably from each other. If a wholly-owned SOE, created "solely by
state capital, managed by political appointees and chartered to serve
the collective good" 27 of a specific polity, was the hallmark of the second
wave of state capitalism, the third wave is characterized by more varied
organizational models.
The organizational models of state ownership can also be broadly
divided into three historical phases. These phases describe the state as
28
an entrepreneur, as a majority investor, and as a minority investor. In
the first phase, the state assumed the role of a service provider, in
circumstances where the private sector was not able to provide a certain
good, in the case of natural monopolies where capital markets were
29
underdeveloped, or for reasons stemming from social policy. In the
second phase, brought about by privatization, the prototypical SOEs of

24. See, e.g., Robert Millward, State Enterprise in Britain in the Twentieth Century, in
THE RISE AND FALL OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN WORLD, supra note 21,

at 157 (providing a long-term perspective and contextual discussion of British state
enterprise).
25. See, e.g., ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF "THE REST": CHALLENGES TO THE WEST
FROM LATE-INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES 213-15 (2001); see also David M. Trubek, The
"Ruleof Law," in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND
ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supranote 5, at 74.
26. See generally Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions:

Understandingthe Mechanismsof State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013)
(examining the organizational structures of SOEs in China); Andreas N61ke et al-,

Domestic Structures,Foreign Economic Policies and Global Economic Order: Implications
from the Rise of Large Emerging Economies, 21 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 538 (2015) (describing
Brazil, India, and China's institutional model for economic governance and the
implications of institutional commonalities for the global economic order).
27. Cuervo-Cazurra et al., supra note 14, at 922.
28. This typology is derived from MUSACCHIO & LAZZARINI, supra note 23, at 25-52.

29. See Jari Kankaanpiiii et al., Steering and Monitoring Model of State-Owned
Enterprises,37 INT'L J. PUB.ADMIN. 409, 409 (2014).

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

23:2

the earlier era were either sold or transformed into more independent
public-private hybrids through listings and governance reforms.30 In the
third phase, prevalent since the 1990s, states continue both to
experiment with their flagship companies, the national champions, and
retain or introduce minority equity positions in a range of former SOEs
and wholly private companies through SWFs, holding companies, and
31
development banks.
In sum, state ownership has both varied in scope and magnitude
and evolved institutionally. Since the heyday of state ownership in the
late 1960s and the early 1970s, SOEs have been reduced in number,
following the capitalist and mixed economies embracing promarket
reforms.3 2 Additionally, the prototypical SOEs with lagging governance
systems mostly have been redesigned. 33 Most importantly, states have
relinquished their status as sole shareholders either through full
privatization or through transforming SOEs into partially privatized
firms by introducing private investors.3 4 This process has culminated in
the rise of a new breed of multinational SOEs that focus more intently
on the global arena. Coinciding with this development, new modes of
sovereign investment through SWFs, holding companies, and
development banks holding stakes in private firms also have emerged. 35
Accordingly, state ownership has evolved into a complex, multifaceted
phenomenon characterized by an array of distinct models pursued by
governments around the globe. 36 Further, the recent rise of state
ownership affirms that state shareholders continue to command
enormous economic power both domestically and internationally.
C. Regulation of State Ownership
Law, whether national, regional, or international, has not remained
indifferent to these changes. The internationalization of state ownership
under the current wave of state capitalism, in particular, has prompted
30. Id.
31. See Cuervo-Cazurra et al., supra note 14, at 938.
32. From the contemporary perspective, it is easy to forget that "Ib]y the 1960s, the
momentum of history appeared to be carrying the entire world toward a reliance on stateowned ventures .... " Galambos & William Baumol, Conclusion: Schumpeter Revisited, in
THE RISE AND FALL OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN WORLD, supra note 21,
at 306.
33. For case studies focusing on governance arrangements in national oil companies,
see OIL AND GOVERNANCE: STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND THE WORLD ENERGY SUPPLY

(David G. Victor et al. eds., 2012).
34. See Cuervo-Cazurra et al., supra note 14, at 922.
35. See id. at 922-23.
36. MUSACCHIO & LAzzARINI, supra note 23, at 282.
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a variety of responses. Most visibly, many governments have been
hesitant to allow for large-scale investment by foreign SOEs. In extreme
cases, national FDI review mechanisms have been used to block
suspicious investments by SOEs or SWFs.3 7 In a similar vein, merger
control has been used to investigate the composition of large emerging
38
market SOEs' ownership structures on a regional level. At the
international level, the proliferating state ownership has been tackled
by trade, 39 investment, 40 and soft law regimes. 41 Significantly, the
treatment of state ownership occupied a central position in negotiations
for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) treaty, 42 culminating in a
separate chapter in the final agreement. 43 Likewise, the ongoing
negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) treaty between the United States and the European Union are
specifically intended to provide "a joint platform of rules which could be
used in other agreements/forums to address concerns raised by the
development of state capitalism."44

Various legal regimes share several common traits, as they utilize
37. See, e.g., Mark A. Clodfelter & Francesca M. S. Guerrero, National Security and
Foreign Government Ownership Restrictions on Foreign Investment: Predictability for
Investors at the National Level, in SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND POLICY, supra
note 6, at 173, 180-86.
38. See, e.g., Angela Huyue Zhang, The Single-Entity Theory: An Antitrust Time Bomb
For Chinese State-Owned Enterprises?, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 805 (2012)
(criticizing the European Commission's analysis of EU Merger Regulations).
39. See, e.g., United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 12.3, May
6, 2003, KAV 6376; Energy Charter Treaty art. 22, Dec. 17 1994, http://www.energy
charter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/1994_ECT.pdf; North American Free Trade
Agreement art.1503, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 108 Stat. 5134, 32 I.L.M. 289; see also
Ming Du, China's State Capitalism and World Trade Law, 63 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 409
(2014).
40. See, e.g., Claudia Annacker, Protection and Admission of Sovereign Investment
Under Investment Treaties, 10 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 531 (2011).
41. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 7; International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth
Funds [IWG], Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices:
available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/
"Santiago Principles" (Oct. 2008),
eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf; see also Larry CatA Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as
Regulatory Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global
Governance Through Private Global Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 425 (2010).
42. See Tsuyoshi Kawase, Trans-PacificPartnershipNegotiations and Rulemaking to
Regulate State-Owned Enterprises, RES. INST. ECON., TRADE & INDUS. (Apr. 22, 2014),
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/special/policy-update/053.html.
43. Trans-Pacific Partnership ch. 17, Feb. 4, 2016, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/iles/TPP-Final-Text-State-Owned-Enterprises-and-Designated-Monopoies.pdf.
44. EU Textual Proposal: Possible Provisions on State Enterprises and Enterprises
Granted Special or Exclusive Rights or Privileges (EC), EU-US TTIP Negotiations of 14-18
July 2014, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153030.
pdf.
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the regulatory rationales developed in the course of dismantling the
heavy state ownership structures from the late 1970s onward. Most
importantly, they attempt to mitigate the market distortions emanating
from the "inefficient" and "political" interface between state
shareholders and their investee corporations. The most extreme views
have highlighted the end of the free market economy in the hands of
state capitalists, 45 but the dominant approach is usually deployed from
the perspective of wholly-owned SOEs as being inefficient, tradehindering, tariff-protected behemoths prone to political rent-seeking. 46
Summarizing the fears shared by many, one recent commentator has
emphasized that
State Enterprise will hardly be independent from the
state. The decision-making bodies will not be such
because their decisions will presumably follow the
directions of the state. The "directing mind and will" of
the company will be, in essence, the government, who,
more likely than not, will prioritize its own (political,
electoral, etc.) interests over the company's ....
[T~he
hallmarking features of independence, accountability
and efficiency, which are supposed to be in on any
ordinary company, are all compromised, if not
neglected. 47
The picture becomes more nuanced, however, when the changes in
the internationalizing scope and the institutional architecture of state
ownership are taken into account. When an increasing number of states
acquire equity stakes in foreign companies through SWFs or when
redesigned, transnationally operating SOEs are involved in massive
FDI projects beneficial to the host country's economy, state ownership in
general gathers greater acceptance and approval. 48 To date, the most
important legal technique used to espouse changes in the world
45. See, e.g., IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR
BETWEEN STATES AND CORPORATIONS? (2010).

46. SOEs have been approached as "a pathology of organizational failure." AMSDEN,
supra note 20, at 215; see also Shapiro & Globerman, supra note 6, at 114-25.
47. ALBERT BADIA, PIERCING THE VEIL OF STATE ENTERPRISES IN INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION 11 (2014).
48. See Anne van Aaken, BlurringBoundaries Between Sovereign Acts and Commercial
Activities: A Functional View on Regulatory Immunity and Immunity from Execution, in
IMMUNITIES IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 131, 131-33 (Anne Peters et al.

eds., 2014). For example, the United Kingdom has been noted as "the most welcoming
economy in the world for government-related agencies to invest in .... " Sophia Grene,
Sovereign Wealth Funds Choose the UK, FIN. TIMES, June 23, 2014, at 1.
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economy has been to treat investment by various state-owned entities as
49
if it were private commercial activity. As argued by China in recent
proceedings at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the presumption
in dealing with state ownership should be "that the SOEs . . . [are]
private bodies." 50 The same argument is visible in corporate law and
53
governance, 51 antitrust law, 52 and investment law, and it builds on the
effect of a robust regulatory structure which has, since the 1970s,
turned state-owned entities more efficient and independent through
improved internal governance and external regulation.
As a corollary, state shareholders have also purposely distanced
themselves from the entrepreneurial and redistributive roles of state
ownership. 54 Instead, states often have assumed the role of a
shareholder that, along with other private shareholders, exercises its
influence over the company using its formal control rights in the course
of market transactions. 55 In particular, states often are encouraged to
participate actively in the functioning of their investee companies in a
shareholder capacity if influencing follows a transparent ownership
policy. In the Santiago Principles, for example, this is reflected in
Principle 21: "SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a
fundamental element of their equity investments' value. If an SWF

49. See, e.g., ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement art. 2(d)-(e), Feb. 26,
2009, available at http://www.asean.org/documents/FINALSIGNED-ACIA.pdf. For a close
parallel with the law of state immunities, see XIAODONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 446-53 (2012) (describing the work of the U.N. International Law
Commission and the debate in the U.N. General Assembly Sixth Committee surrounding
the question of legal distinction between a State and certain of its entities in respect of
State Immunity).

50. Appellate Body Report, United States-DefinitiveAnti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties on CertainProductsfrom China, para. 44, WT/DS379/ABJR (Mar. 11, 2011).
51. See generally MICHAEL J. WHINCOP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS (2005) (describing strong governance practice in corporatized government
organizations); Ginka Borisova et al., Government Ownership and Corporate Governance:
Evidence from the EU, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 2917 (2012); Zhaofeng Wang, Corporate

Governance Under State Control: The Chinese Experience, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
487 (2012).
52. See, e.g., Council Non-Opposition to Notified Concentration Case COMP/M.6082,
2011 O.J. (C 274) 7 (EC).

53. See, e.g., Charles H. Brower, II, Corporations as Plaintiffs Under International
Law: Three Narratives About Investment Treaties, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 179 (2011);
Michael Feit, Responsibility of the State Under International Law for the Breach of
Contract Committed by a State-Owned Entity, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 142 (2010).

54. See Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REV. 83, 99-119, 148-49

(2008) (discussing SWs in the broader contexts of regulatory interests and state
capitalism).
55. This process has been noted to have eradicated many of the agency problems at the
roots of the privatization programs. See MUSACCHIO & LAZZARINI, supra note 23, at 288.
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chooses to exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in a manner that
is consistent with its investment policy and protects the financial value
of its investments. ' 6 Similarly, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Guidelines on Corporate
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises emphasize that "the state
should act as an informed and active owner." 57
In sum, legal response to the new rise of state ownership has
followed the precedent set by the privatization experience since the
1970s. Target states occasionally have been hesitant to let in SOEs' FDI
and SWF investments due to fears of conflation between public and
private aims behind the actions of companies and their state
shareholders. At the same time, SOEs' home states have repeatedly
emphasized a tight separation and independence of "their" SOEs from
undue governmental influence. Instead, both the companies and their
state shareholders are portrayed as operating through private market
actor identities and mechanisms, such as shareholder power used
within the limits set by national corporate law and international best
practices. Consequently, the destabilization brought about by the rise of
state ownership mostly has been contained through regulatory
techniques developed in the course of privatization.
D. The Missing Link: United Nations and Human Rights?
Significantly, these most recent regulatory techniques seem to evade
the core U.N. forums entirely. Historically, however, the United Nations
has served as a key node in coming to terms with the effects of state
ownership. Intense discourses on permanent sovereignty over natural
resources and decolonization-era nationalizations, for example, usually
included a strong state ownership component.58 Similarly, the efforts to
negotiate multilateral instruments, such as the Set of Multilaterally
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive
Business Practices 59 and the-ultimately failed-Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations,60 often turned to the question of SOEs. In
56. IWG, supranote 41, at 22.
57. OECD, supra note 7, at 13.
58. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 38-41 (3d
ed. 2010).
59. United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, The Set of
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive
Business Practices, Apr. 22, 1980, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10 (1980).
60. See generally Karl P. Sauvant, The Negotiations of the United Nations Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations:Experience and Lessons Learned, 16 J. WORLD
INV. & TRADE 11 (2015) (explaining the origin and underlying interest situations behind
the negotiations for the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations).
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particular, major disagreement between developed, developing, and
socialist states remained over the applicability of the proposed rules to
SOEs. 6 1 More recently, state ownership has been discussed prominently
in drafting the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property. 62 Despite these examples, the core U.N. institutions
have increasingly yielded their influence in SOE-related matters, as in
other branches of economic law and policy, to specialized organizations
and regimes such as the WTO,63the OECD, and various bilateral trade
and investment treaty systems.
Beyond the diminishing significance of the United Nations as a
forum for regulating economic activity, the U.N. human rights system
has traditionally paid scant attention to state ownership. Some human
rights treaty bodies have made limited interventions in SOE questions
but, until recently, human rights implications of state ownership rarely
64
have been featured in the United Nation's policy or regulatory actions.
While the rationales and practices of using direct state ownership as a
tool for social policy to improve the welfare of citizens do have a
historical connection to the economic development aims of the United
Nations, they generally are not discussed in the terminology of human
rights.6 5 Nevertheless, the growing significance of state-owned entities
and state shareholders in the global economy frequently affects the
realization of human rights, both domestically and at the international
level.
In the emerging business and human rights literature, SOEs often66
are presented as a special case of corporate human rights obligations.
61. See U.N. Ctr. on Transnational Corps., Transnational Corporations in World
Development: Third Survey, UN Doc. ST/CTC/46 (1983).
62. See YANG, supra note 49, at 446-53.
63. See generallyMargot E. Salomon, From NIEO to Now and the Unfinishable Story of
Economic Justice, 62 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 31, 46-47 (2013) (explaining how the larger
international economic and legal orders of the globe have disadvantaged the poor).
64. See, e.g., U.N. HUM. RTS. COMM., SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL, at 124, UN. DOC. CCPRIC/OP/1, U.N. Sales No. E.84.XIV.2 (1985) (examining
Leo Hertzberg et al. v. Finland).
65. See generally MUSACCHIO & LAZZARINI, supra note 23, at 60-62 (exploring the
social aspects of state capitalism). For a critique of SOEs' social functions, see Joseph
Heath &. Wayne Norman, Stakeholder Theory, Corporate Governance and Public
Management: What Can the History of State-Run Enterprises Teach Us in the Post-Enron
Era?, 53 J. Bus. ETHICS 247, 255-61 (2004).

66. See, e.g., Surya Deva, Treating Human Rights Lightly: A Critique of the Consensus
Rhetoric and the Language Employed by the Guiding Principles, in HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 78, 9596 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013); CAMILLA WEE, INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS,
REGULATING THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: TENDENCIES OF
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY (2008), http://198.170.85.29/
State-owned-enterprises-Oct-08.pdf; see also ANTENOR HALLO DE WOLF, RECONCILING
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Further, human rights have started to emerge as a specific subgroup
within the wider corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement, which
increasingly targets SOEs.67 Broadening the focus from individual
SOEs, state ownership also is discussed in functional terms that are
more responsive to the new forms of state ownership arrangements.
While the scholarship is diverse, ranging from the use of sovereign
wealth in promoting human rights abroad 68 to downplaying the
possibility of sovereign investment triggering state responsibility, 6 9
these interventions still see the internationalization of state ownership
as a regulatory space opened by the changing economic realities. 70 As
such, the emerging "human rights turn" in conceptualizing the limits of
state shareholder power may be indicative of a larger shift in the ways
state ownership is understood. The current reinvigoration and
reinvention of state ownership, together with the attempts to develop
human rights checks and balances in state ownership policies, both
challenges and augments the traditional regulatory vision, which has,
since the late 1970s onward, emphasized the democratic and economic
perils associated with the open intervention of the state. The remainder
of this article discusses human rights dimensions of state ownership in
a range of law and policy discourses and, then, in the practice of the
U.N. human rights system.
II. HUMAN

RIGHTS DIMENSIONS OF STATE OWNERSHIP

The previous section described the rise and reinvention of modern
state ownership as a reinvigorated site of state power. This section
introduces a more general view on societal effects of state ownership
PRIVATIZATION WITH HUMAN RIGHTS (2011) (addressing the issues of accountability for the
counduct of entities exercising governmental functions).
67. See, e.g., Anne Welle-Strand & Monica Vlaicu, Business and State Balancing
InternationalDevelopment Agendas - The Case of Norwegian CSR, 6 J. POL. & LAW 103
(2013); Juliet Roper & Mich61e Schoenberger-Orgad, State-Owned Enterprises: Issues of
Accountability and Legitimacy, 25 MGMT. COMM. Q. 693 (2011).
68. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based
TransnationalRule of Law Building: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global
Markets, 29 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1 (2013) (explaining that SOEs operate in a new area of
international law that implicates human rights).
69. See, e.g., Bruno Demeyere, Sovereign Wealth Funds and (Un)Ethical Investment:
Using Due Diligence' to Avoid Contributing to Human Rights Violations Committed by
Companies in the Investment Portfolio, in HUMAN RIGHTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY AND
DISINVESTMENT 183, 220-21 (Gro Nystuen et al. eds., 2011).
70. In the context of human rights governance, the term "regulatory space" is derived
from Christine Parker & John Howe, Ruggie's Diplomatic Project and Its Missing
Regulatory Infrastructure, in THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 273, 283-85 (Radu Mares ed., 2012).
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and submits that viewing state ownership through the lenses of peril,
potential, and specialty teases out the human rights dimensions behind
the surging state ownership. Using diverse examples, such as the U.N.
Security Council's asset freeze imposed on the Qaddafi regime in
Libya, 71 this section also posits that the coupling of state ownership and
human rights reflects the critiques mounted against state ownership
since the 1970s.
A. The Perils of State Ownership
For the past forty years, state ownership has often been associated
with a number of perils such as economic inefficiency and rentseeking.7 2 As a corollary, state ownership also has been noted to
contribute to a number of adverse societal impacts. Consider, for
example, the way the Security Council developed a thorough sanctions
regime with the aim to oust the Libyan autocratic leadership from
power in 2011.73 As a part of the regime, the Security Council froze the
assets of various Libyan SOEs, including the Libyan National Oil
Corporation and several SWFs. Based on the formal connections of
these entities with the leadership or their alleged connections with
certain notable persons belonging to the Qaddafi family, the rationale
behind the designations was to stop these SOEs from funding the
Libyan government.7 4 Consequently, in the Libyan case, the sanctioned
entities appeared as instrumentalities of oppression, even if their
75
function was limited to providing financial stability for the regime. As
such, the perils of state ownership were brought about by the
exploitative relationships between national wealth and its extended
control and accumulation by a small elite group detrimental to the
human rights of the Libyan people at large.
Similar peril narratives are the most prevalent forms of connecting
71. See, e.g., Evan J Criddle, HumanitarianFinancialIntervention, 24 EUR.J. INT'L L.
583, 606-614 (2013).
72. See Shapiro & Globerman, supra note 6, at 114-25.
73. See generally Giorgio Sacerdoti & Pia Acconci, The Security Council's Asset Freeze
Against Gaddafi's Libya and Its Implementation in Italy, 21 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 61, 6271 (2011) (detailing the United Nation's boycott of Libyan SOEs to protest Qaddafi's
human rights violations).
74. See U.N. Panel of Experts on Libya, Rep., transmitted by Letter dated 17 February
2012 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)
addressed to the President of the Security Council, annex II, U.N. Doc. S/2012/163 (Feb.
17, 2012).
75. Cf. Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Mariana Rulli, Corporate Complicity and Finance as
a 'KillingAgent. The Relevance of the Chilean Case, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 829, 839-46

(2010).
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state ownership with human rights. 76 In the most common account,
state ownership appears as a domestic policy tool that is used to develop
certain areas or industries, regardless of its adverse impacts77 Thus, in
extreme conditions, state ownership appears to appropriate public
resources for private gain without due consideration of the human
78
rights outcomes.
Another good example of such a narrative is the construction of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, a major resource development
project in the early 2000s.7 9 Because of intense international scrutiny,
an independent advisory panel was established to assess its
environmental and social impacts, including its human rights impacts.8 0
In the course of its work, the panel focused on the activities of the
Turkish state-owned company BOTA$. The panel's assessment stated
that "BOTAS and its contractors might feel pressure to cut corners on
environmental, social, and technical standards to remain on schedule
and under budget" and that "senior officials in key government
ministries ... openly expressed their view that the environmental and
76. See, e.g., Steven Globerman, Host Governments Should Not Treat State-Owned
Enterprises Differently than Other Foreign Investors (Columbia FDI Perspectives,
Perspectives on Topical Foreign Direct Investment Issues No. 138, Jan. 5, 2015), available
at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-138-Globerman-FINALI.pdf.
77. This narrative surfaces particularly well in claims brought under the Alien Tort
Claims Act in the United States, with cases probing the relationship between private
Western developers and state-owned entities pursuing the policy of authoritarian regimes.
Doe v. Unocal, for example, concerned the company turning a blind eye on Myanmar Oil
and Gas Enterprise's and Myanmar's military's use of forced labor in early 1990s. See Doe
v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman conveys a similar story with a Canadian
developer's involvement in a consortium with Sudanese SOE casting a shadow over the
company. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d
Cir. 2009).
78. See, e.g., Yukos Universal Ltd. v. The Russian Fed'n, Case No. AA 227 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 2014). For discussion of Yukos, see Eric De Brabandere, Yukos Universal Limited
(Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation: Complementarity or Conflict? Contrasting the
Yukos Case Before the European Court of Human Rights and Investment Tribunals, 30
ICSID REV. 345, 352-55 (2015).
79. The example is drawn from Annie Dufey & Rasmiya Kazimoza, Project Finance
Arrangements for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Project: Human Rights and Sustainable
Development Implications, in GLOBAL PROJECT FINANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 364 (Sheldon Leader & David Ong eds., 2011).
80. See CASPIAN DEV. ADVISORY PANEL, REPORT ON TURKEY AND PROJECT-RELATED
SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA, AND TURKEY 81-85 (2003),
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp-country/en~az/pdf/CDAP-reports/CDAP Turkey Report
Final.pdf (explaining the Caspian Development Advisory Panel's concerns regarding the
environmental, social, and human rights responsibilities of BOTA$, the state-owned
Turkish pipeline construction company that designed and constructed the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan oil pipeline).
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. Agreement and EIA [Environmental Impact

Assessment] were too stringent and should be relaxed."8' Consequently,
in the panel's view, the regulatory environment in which BOTA$
operated had been loosened, and the company was allowed to impose
economic incentives
additional harm on individuals due to the strong
82
issue.
the
in
had
state
the
and
company
both the
Here, the peril narrative warned of a skewed regulatory
environment, which is, by itself, a major feature of the traditional
critiques mounted against state ownership. In short, state ownership
stood out as a form of privilege: SOEs may not need to provide
information on their performance, thus undermining effective external
oversight; ample opportunities are created for corruption and political
manipulation; and the government's ability to combine the ownership of
SOEs with regulatory powers can further insulate SOEs from the
normal market forces, for example with regard to the pressure from
potential creditors.8 3 This narrative holds even in the absence of official
regulation and oversight, as SOEs often are well protected from the
normal market pressures that would otherwise discourage mainstream
MNCs from carrying out human rights abuses.8 4 Additionally, it is
interesting to note the independent panel's recommendations to
alleviate the structural problems relating to BOTA$. In its view, the
responsibility to correct abusive practices lay with the project's main
developer, British Petroleum (BP), which was advised "to use its
leverage, including (if necessary) stoppage of work, to ensure that
'
BOTAS fulfills the commitments BP and BTC have made in the EIA." 5
In BOTA$, the peril narrative was confined within national
borders.8 6 However, following the rise of internationally-oriented state
ownership,8 7 cross-border implications, whether in the form of
multinational SOEs' activities or sovereign investment more generally,
have become more pertinent. In this connection, the perils of state
ownership often are approached as economic nationalism that, at best,
pays scant attention to the labor conditions in host countries, and, at
worst, exacerbates the existing conflicts, immiserating already

81. Id.
82. Id. at 84-85; see also Dufey & Kazimoza, supra note 79, at 385-87.
83. International commercial arbitration and international investment arbitration are
full of these examples. See BADJA, supra note 47, at 1-16.
84. See Globerman, supra note 76, at 2.
85. CASPIAN DEV. ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 80, at 85 (italics omitted).
86. See id.
87. See discussion in sections I.B. and I.C., supra.
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marginalized groups. 88 With regard to Chinese FDI, these peril
narratives take a number of forms, from Chinese unconcern for
workplace safety in the form of hard hats8 9 to charges of contribution to
genocide when "the economic power of CNPC [Chinese National
Petroleum Company] and the military power of the PLA [People's
Liberation Army]" are welded together with "the international political
power of the government in Beijing."90
B. The Potentialsof State Ownership
Similar to peril narratives, understanding state ownership through
the lens of potential also is grounded in seeing ownership as an
instrumentality. 91 In the case of the sanctions regime against Libya, for
example, the potential narrative surfaced in the context of the Security
Council establishing the conditions under which the sanctions on SOEs
could be lifted. The aim of the regime was to sever the previous
exploitative relationships between the Libyan national wealth and its
extended control by an autocratic elite. In this connection, the Security
Council highlighted the "importance of making these assets available in
a transparent and responsible manner in conformity with the needs and
wishes of the Libyan people." 92 As such, the potential narrative appears
to be embedded in a view of state ownership as part and parcel of social
development in the public interest. 93
Concentrating on the human rights potential of state ownership
yields, naturally, a more focused potential narrative, which has recently
embraced the transnational scope of ownership activity. Unlike the peril
discourse, which sees the rise of state capitalism as economic statecraft
detrimental to human rights, the potential narrative underscores that
the financial leverage of states can also have positive effects on the
enjoyment of human rights globally. This narrative takes the formal
88. See Helle Abelvik-Lawson, Sustainable Development for Whose Benefit? Brazil's
Economic Power and Human Rights Violations in the Amazon and Mozambique, 18 INT'L
J. HuM. RTS. 795, 807-12 (2014).
89. See May Tan-Mullins & Giles Mohan, The Potential of Corporate Environmental
Responsibility of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in Africa, 15 ENVT. DEV.
SUSTAINABILTY 265, 277 (2013); see also Du, supra note 6, at 1136.
90. Michael J. Kelly, Ending Corporate Impunity for Genocide: The Case Against
China's State-Owned Petroleum Company in Sudan, 90 OR. L. REV. 414, 423 (2011) (italics
omitted).
91. The idea of human rights potential is derived from Patrick J. Keenan & Christiana
Ochoa, The Human Rights Potential of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 40 GEORG. J. INT'L L.
1151 (2009).
92. S.C. RES. 2009, preamble, U.N. DOC. S/RES/2009 (Sept. 16, 2011).
93. See MUSACCIUO & LAZZARINI, supra note 23, at 60-62.
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94
rights of control granted to state shareholders as its starting point.
Taking note of the ownership policies in various states, SOEs often are
expected to become model employers, for example by taking their
human rights impacts into account throughout their supply chains.
More broadly, state ownership is conceived as generating a general
financial leverage that has the ability to contribute to a positive change
in the conduct of the investee companies beyond traditional whollyowned SOEs. 95 The most discussed example of the human rights
potential of sovereign investment is the investment activity pursued by
the Norwegian Pension Fund Global ("the Fund"). 96 With a dedicated
supervisory Council of Ethics, the Fund has been involved in a number
of human rights-based divestments globally. On this reading, the Fund,
commanding equivalent to 1.3 percent of the equities of every publiclylisted company in the world, may invoke its shareholder power to
97
civilize corporations through the international markets.
This form of the potential narrative meshes well with the rise of
modern state ownership structures that steer away from wholly-owned
SOEs and, instead, toward heterogeneous ownership structures. In this
case, the human rights potential is sought by imposing on investee
companies human-rights-oriented policies stemming from the power of

94. Cf. Peter Muchlinski, The Changing Face of TransnationalBusiness Governance:
Private Corporate Law Liability and Accountability of Transnational Groups in a PostFinancialCrisis World, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 665, 692-98 (2011) ("[D]irect state
participation in business may allow for greater leverage over corporate activity in the
public interest, at least in relation to enterprises from accountable, democratic
countries.").
95. See Eva Van Der Zee, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Socially Responsible
Investment: Dos and Don'ts, 9 EUR. Co. L. 141, 148-49 (2012). The specialty of SOEs often
was emphasized in the 20th century state ownership experience. In France, nationalized
corporations also were seen as enlighteners or model employers; Renault, for example,
was considered a laboratory of "industrial relations." Emmanuel Chadeau, The Rise and
Decline of State-Owned Industry in Twentieth-Century France, in THE RISE AND FALL OF
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN WORLD, supranote 21, at 185, 201.
96. See generally Gro Nystuen, Disinvestment on the Basis of CorporateContribution to
Human Rights Violations: The Case of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY AND DISINVESTMENT, supra note 69, at 16
(discussing the Ethical Guidelines of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund); Anna
Gelpern, Sovereignty, Accountability, and the Wealth Fund Governance Conundrum, 1
ASIAN J. INT'L L. 289 (2011) (discussing the Norwegian Pension Global Fund in the
contexts of public, private, domestic, and external accountability); Gurneeta Vasudeva,
Weaving Together the Normative and Regulative Roles of Government: How the Norwegian
Sovereign Wealth Fund's Responsible Conduct Is Shaping Firms' Cross-Border
Investments, 24 ORG. SCI. 1662 (2013) (arguing that the Norwegian Pension Global Fund
has societal implications that transcend international borders).
97. See The Fund, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund (last
visited Dec. 10, 2015).
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shareholder action. This allows for a state to project its power, in the
form of shareholder power, beyond jurisdictional limits.98 In some
accounts, this type of shareholder activism by governments has been
considered one of the few "effective tools left to address legal or ethical
violations, since hard power tools such as economic sanctions have ..
largely failed." 99
C. The Specialty Narrative
In the peril and potential narratives, state ownership appears either
as an instrument of oppression or as an instrument of turning
companies into responsible corporate citizens. Both of these views are
grounded in the special connection between investee companies and
their state shareholders. 100 The domestic elements of state ownership
form the core of the specialty narrative. This was the main thrust of the
Libyan sanctions regime, where the "importance of making . .. assets
available . . . with the needs and wishes of the Libyan people" was
emphasized, as is the case with human-rights-sensitive sovereign
investment as a public institution distributing national wealth.1 01 As
such, the specialty of state ownership is usually determined by the fact
that the distributed resources are public money "with ramifications for
their citizen-beneficiaries."1 02 While the human rights implications of
state ownership often are discussed, the narrative usually is framed in
terms of the responsible use of sovereign wealth. Therefore, the
potential of state ownership rarely is understood as an obligation under
constitutional or human rights law and more often as a policy
preference stemming from state shareholders being capable of

98. See Backer, supra note 68, at 28-30 (discussing the role of the Ethics Council in the
dispute process).
99. Salar Ghahramani, Governments, Financial Markets, and International Human
Rights: The State's Role as Shareholder, 6 YALE J.INT'L AFF. 85, 93 (2011).
100. In this article, "specialty" refers to accountability mechanisms and legal techniques
through which the use of sovereign wealth is exposed to human rights governance
instruments. Due to their human rights commitments, state inventors have "special"
responsibilities under international law to respect human rights in view of their public
funding and public duties that extend to their ownership policies. Naturally, there are
numerous other accountability mechanisms that affect the governance of public wealth.
For an extended case study of a national accountability matrix, see Kankaanpaa et al.,
supra note 29, at 414-19.
101. S.C. RES. 2009, supra note 84, at preamble; see also Angela Cummine, Ethical
Sovereign Investors: Sovereign Wealth Funds amd Human Rights, in MAKING SOVEREIGN
FINANCING AND HuMAN RIGHTS WORK 163, 164-69 (Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Jernej

Letnar
merni6
eds., 2014).
102. Cummine, supra note 101, at 164.
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sustaining longer investment horizons. 103 In some accounts, "SWFs are
in a unique position and, therefore, have a higher responsibility towards
respecting human rights and protecting the environment," 104 but
usually the specialty of state ownership emerges in broader political
terms.
Following the rise of internationally deployed state ownership,
however, the connection between national wealth and the focus on
citizen-beneficiaries has changed.' 0 5 The traditional view of state
ownership as bringing about public goods for a given polity has less
purchase when the coupling of popular benefit to state ownership
policies expands from the domestic sphere to the international.
Simultaneously, state ownership has evolved from wholly-owned SOEs
to minority-owned organizations operating in competitive markets. As a
consequence, state ownership policies increasingly impact individuals at
the global level, while the influence that the states have over the
operating entities has gradually eroded to the mere formal exercise of
shareholder rights. 06 When a state has been transformed into "just
another" shareholder with powers and information not substantially
different from those of private investors, the specialty narrative is also
transformed. In this mode, the limits of state shareholder power are
emphasized, suggesting that state shareholders assume passive or
"quiet" roles, especially in the context of human-rights-sensitive
10 7
shareholder activism and corporate governance in general.
Accordingly, the specialty narrative increasingly reflects the ways that
state shareholders and SOEs are accommodated in the dominant
regulatory infrastructure, which privileges the tightly separated roles,
and the distinct public and private identities, of regulator and market
103. Id. at 164, 172-74. Other factors to consider are the various institutional pressures
affecting state ownership policies. See generally Gelpern, supra note 88. For a Chinese
case study, see Glen Whelan & Judy Muthuri, Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and

Human Rights: The Importance of National and Intra-OrganizationalPressures, Bus. &
Soc'Y (forthcoming), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-2441113.

104. Van Der Zee, supra note 95, at 147.
105. C.f. Backer, supra note 41, at 491 (contrasting the substantive differences between
the public Norwegian Fund and the private TIAA-CREF fund).
106. Further, both corporate governance and international soft law regimes actively
encourage states to use their influence options as shareholders, provided they do so in a
transparent and predictable way. See OECD, supra note 7, at 11-12; see also IWG, supra
note 41, at 22-23.
107. See Rose, supra note 54, at 119; Bernardo Bortolotti et al., Quiet Leviathans:

Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment, Passivity,and the Value of the Firm 9 (Oct. 25, 2010),
at
http://www.baffi.unibocconi.it/wps/allegatiCTP/SWF-paper-RFS-Finalavailable
oct25_2010.pdf. It has, however, been suggested that sovereign investment increasingly is
turning toward activist tendencies. See Bader Alhashel, Sovereign Wealth Funds: A
LiteratureReview, 78 J. ECON. & Bus. 1, 10 (2015).
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participant.105
Each of the three narratives described above offers a distinct
perspective on coupling state ownership and human rights. The peril
narrative transfers privatization-era regulatory "common sense" to the
realm of the societal impacts of state ownership. The potential narrative
proposes a policy entry point where shareholder power is used to civilize
corporate actions beyond states' jurisdictional confines. The specialty
narrative embeds the realization of human rights within responsible use
of sovereign wealth in an era where state ownership increasingly is
going abroad. Together, they suggest that state ownership matters
greatly for a general human rights enterprise. The following section
interrogates more focused human rights governance instruments
through these narratives.
III. STATE OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS
GOVERNANCE INSTRUMENTS

The previous section drew connections between state ownership and
human rights using the narratives of peril, potential, and specialty. This
section interrogates the ways in which these narratives surface in three
U.N. human rights governance instruments: the Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (GPs), implementing the "Protect, Respect
and Remedy" framework (Framework); the Committee of the Rights of
the Child (CRC) General Comment No. 16 (CRC Comment 16); and the
Global Compact's Human Rights and Business Dilemmas Forum's
treatment of SOEs (GCDF). I argue that the instruments recognize the
proliferation of state ownership, reflect its importance and dimensions,
and identify state ownership as an effective site of human rights
governance. Taken together, the U.N. instruments expose a more
general tendency to treat the market as the most important site for
advancing the business and human rights agenda.
A. Introduction to the U.N. Human Rights Governance Instruments
The social impacts of companies have been on the U.N. agenda for
decades. Prominent since the 1970s, a number of regulatory
interventions have been proposed, ranging from the emphasis on states'
right to regulate corporate activity in their jurisdiction to nonbinding

108. See Danny Nicol, Business Rights as Human Rights, in THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: SCEPTICAL ESSAYS 229 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 2011) (arguing that no
compelling basis exists on which business rights can be disentangled from classic political
human rights).
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codes of conduct. Often grouped under the umbrella of the CSR

movement, the U.N. discussion has adopted a distinct human rights
approach to corporate regulation since the 1990s. 10 9 Over some twentyfive years, various U.N. bodies have attempted to conceptualize the
status of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in international law and the
ways for alleviating their most adverse human rights impacts. In recent
years, the efforts mostly have taken individual rights holders as their
starting point. While the concrete approaches have varied from
corporate self-regulation to a greater articulation of the extraterritorial
human rights obligations of states, the international human rights
a central focus in the United Nation's efforts to
system has remained 110
"civilize globalization" and to bring about "just business.""'1
An early example of the U.N. efforts was the Global Compact
(GC).112 Intended as a "practical framework for the development,
implementation, and disclosure of sustainability policies and
practices," 113 the GC consists of principled initiatives in the areas of
human rights, labor, the environment, and anticorruption. With over
12,000 corporate participants and other stakeholders from over 145
countries, it is the largest voluntary corporate responsibility initiative
in the world. 114 As a part of the GC's practical focus, the initiative
supports a variety of multistakeholder forums for sharing best practices
in sustainability policies. 115 One of the more recent issues raised in
these Human Rights and Business Dilemma Forums has been the case
11
of SOEs. 6
While the GC remains a voluntary initiative in its human rights
orientation, the United Nations also has probed more binding solutions.
In 2003, for example, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
109. See generally JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006)
(examining the CSR movement in the context of international law).
110. See generally DAVID KINLEY, CIVILISING GLOBALISATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2009) (analyzing the manner in which human rights intersect with
different facets of global economic relations).
111. See generally JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013) (examining the roap map for the 2005 U.N.
Guiding Principles, which ensured responsible global corporate practices).
112. See generally THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT: ACHIEVEMENTS, TRENDS
AND CHALLENGES (Andreas Rasche & Georg Kell eds., 2010) (reflecting on the U.N. Global
Compact's implications for human rights and corporate behavior).
113. The United Nations Global Compact, GLOBAL COMPACT CITIES PROGRAMME,
http://citiesprogramme.com/aboutus/the-un-global-compact (last visited Dec. 10, 2015).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Working with SOEs, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS DILEMMAS FORUM,
http://human-rights.unglobalcompact.org/dilemmas/working-soe (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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Protection of Human Rights approved the Norms on the Responsibilities
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, which sought to extend the broad human
rights duties to companies.1 17 Even though these failed to gain traction,
the United Nations has continued to interrogate the interface between
human rights protection and corporate operations. Culminating in the
unanimous endorsement of the Framework and the GPs on June 16,
2011, by the U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC), the instrument devised
by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), John
Ruggie, has been heralded as one of the most important attempts to
sketch a transnational regulatory framework to counter the adverse
human rights impacts caused by business enterprises. 118 While not
binding, the Framework and the GPs have enjoyed considerable
purchase with governments, international organizations, and the
business sector. For example, a number of national and international
instruments and policy documents recently have been revised to
correspond with the GPs.119
The governance template epitomized by the Framework and the
GPs positions corporate conduct in the context of liberalized and
globalized trade, addresses the governance gaps that enable corporate
human rights abuses, and deems existing regulatory responses
ineffective for containing alleged corporate human rights impacts.120

117. See United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm. on the
Promotion & Protection of Hum. Rts., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12Rev.2 (Aug. 26,.2003). See
generally David Kinley & Rachel Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for
Corporations:The PrivateImplications of Public InternationalLaw, 6 HuM. RTS. L. REv.
447 (2006) (addressing whether the Norms serve as the correct framework to account for
corporate human rights abuses at the international level).
118. See, e.g., John H. Knox, The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to
Corporations, in THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 70, at 51, 61-69; Larry CatA Backer,
From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance: The Guiding
Principlesfor the Implementation of the United Nation's "Protect,Respect and Remedy"
and the Construction of Inter-Systemic Global Governance, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
BUS. DEV. L. J. 101, 107-13 (2011).
119. See, e.g., OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 12 (2011),
available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-guidelnes-for-multinationalenterprises_9789264115415-en; Int'l Fin. Corp., IFC Performance Standards on
Environmental and Social Sustainability (2012), available at http://wwwl.ifc.org/wps/
wcm/connect/c8f524004a73daecaO9afdf998895al2/IFCPerformanceStandards.pdf?MOD
=AJPERES.
120. See U.N. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights: Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-Generalon
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The end result of the mandate, the Framework and the GPs, rests on
three equally important sections, or pillars: (i) states have a duty to
protect against human rights abuses committed by third parties,
including business enterprises; (ii) business enterprises have a
responsibility to respect human rights; and (iii) victims of businessrelated human rights abuses need greater access to effective
121
remedies.
Since then, different U.N. organs and treaty bodies have built on the
Framework and the GPs in their attempts to operationalize and apply
them in the course of human rights monitoring. Of these, CRC
Comment 16 constitutes the first systematic attempt by a U.N. treaty
body to apply the lessons drawn from the SRSG's mandate to a specific
branch of human rights law. 122 Therefore, it is the first U.N. attempt of
its kind to elaborate how state duties and corporate responsibilities
align in human rights law and what kind of positive actions state
parties ought to take under the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.123
While obviously not conclusive, a careful reading of the GCDF, the
Framework and the GPs, and CRC Comment 16 is sufficient to establish
the core tenets of the U.N. human rights governance in the sphere of
corporate activity. In the following sections, these instruments will be
analyzed with regard to their treatment of state ownership. 124 In the
case of the Framework and the GPs, all the reports leading to the
culmination of the SRSG's mandate are analyzed. By contrast, the
GCDF and CRC Comment 16 will be treated in a more concise way,
emphasizing the practical orientation of the former, as well as the close
connection to the human rights system of the latter.
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises,U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Interim Report].
121. See Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A
17-26, 88, U.N. Doc. A/HRCI815 (Apr. 7,
Framework for Business and Human Rights,
2008) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter 2008 FrameworkReport].
122. See Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, General Comment 16 (2013) on State
ObligationsRegarding the Impact of the Business Sector on Children'sRights, 62d Sess.,
Jan. 14-Feb. 1, 2013, U.N. Doc. CRC/CIGCI16 (Apr. 17, 2013) [hereinafter CRC].
123. For discussion positioning CRC Comment 16 within the Framework, the GPs, and
the international human rights system, see Paula Gerber et al., General Comment 16 on
State ObligationsRegarding the Impact of the Business Sector on Children's Rights: What
Is its Standing, Meaning and Effect?, 14 MELB. J. INT'L L. 93 (2013); see also Tara M.
Collins, The Relationship Between Children's Rights and Business, 18 INT'L J. HuM. RTS.
582 (2014).
124. In previous scholarship, the relationship between the Framework and SOEs has
been discussed at some length. See SURYA DEVA, REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS: HUMANIZING BUSINESS 110-11 (2012); Deva, supra note 66, at 96; Backer,

supranote 118, at 163-64.
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The human rights governance instruments investigated here are
diverse but complementary. The Framework and the GPs form the
backbone of the contemporary U.N. human rights governance, which is
functional in its outlook. CRC Comment 16 emanates more clearly from
the U.N. human rights system, as it pays heed to the doctrinal aspects
of human rights law. The GCDF, on the other hand, is deployed from
the perspective of business self-regulation. It is the only instrument
with a practical orientation, probing real-world circumstances in which
state ownership and human rights surface.
B. How Do the U.N. Instruments Understand State Ownership?
As discussed above, 125 state ownership raises a number of complex
economic, legal, and policy questions. For this reason, this section
attempts to distinguish the various ways in which the U.N. instruments
conceptualize state ownership prior to addressing the peril, potential,
and specialty narratives.
As a general rule, the U.N. instruments approach state ownership
primarily through the lens of individual SOEs. In the Framework and
the GPs, for example, states are advised to "take additional steps to
protect against human rights abuses by business enterprises that are
owned or controlled by the State."126 In CRC Comment 16, "all Stateowned enterprises" are instructed to undertake child-rights due
diligence. 127 In the GCDF, a number of individual SOEs are singled out
8
as examples of perilous conduct. 12
Against this backdrop, it is interesting that, despite numerous
references, none of the instruments provides a clear definition of what
constitutes an SOE. Questions, such as whether only wholly- or
majority-owned corporations qualify as SOEs or whether a specified
statutory function or public policy purpose is needed, are not thoroughly
entertained. 129 Further, varying uses of SOEs in different regions is

125. See discussion in sections I.B. and I.C., supra.
126. See U.N. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principleson Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy"
Framework, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/17/31, at 9-10 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter
2011 GPs Report].
127. CRC, supranote 122, 64.
128. See Working with SOEs, supra note 116.
129. Compare with the position of the UNCTAD whereby SOEs are understood as
corporations of which government has a controlling interest. Control is defined as a stake
of 10 percent or more of the voting power, Transnational Corporations (TNC), UNCTAD,
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Transnational-corporations-(TNC).aspx
(last
visited
March 12, 2016), or where the government is the largest single shareholder, UNCTAD,
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hinted at, but their status as strategic instruments employed by
emerging economies is not pursued at length. 130 Finally, no references
are made to existing regulatory responses or to the extensive state
ownership literature in the fields of corporate governance, competition
law, trade law, or investment law.
Despite this starting point, there is a great deal of flexibility in
positioning the narratives over a range of actors. In particular, there are
at least three instances where the U.N. instruments depart from the
SOE perspective and adopt a more functional approach. First, the
instruments point out that neither the entities' nor states' influence
potential is monolithic. Instead, when discussing how states were to
approach SOEs, the SRSG held that the "senior management in SOEs is
typically appointed by and reports to State entities"'131 and that
"[a]ssociated government departments have greater scope for scrutiny"
in their actions. 132 This was also the impetus behind CRC Comment
16.133 The GCDF also addressed a range of avenues through which
"States can exercise different degrees of control over SOEs," including
holding sole or majority shareholder positions and their ability to
appoint directors, and to oblige SOEs to directly report to state
134

agencies.

Second, the instruments recognize the connection between SWF
investments and state oversight of SOE activities. Switching the lens to
state responsibility, in its 2008 report the SRSG claimed that
the

State

itself

may

be

held

responsible

under

World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generationof Investment Policies (2012),
availableat http:l/unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir20l2_embargoeden.pdf.
130. See U.N. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Implementation of General
Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled "HumanRights Council": Business
and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and
1 81, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/4/035, (Feb. 9, 2007)
Accountability for Corporate Acts,
[hereinafter 2007 Mapping Report].
131. 2008 Framework Report, supra note 121, $ 32; see also Special Representative of
the Secretary-General, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15
March 2006 Entitled "HumanRights Council" Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises,Addendum: State Responsibilitiesto Regulate and Adjudicate
CorporateActivities under the United Nations Core Human Rights Treaties: An Overview
79, 4th Sess. Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc.
of Treaty Body Commentaries,
A/IHRC/4/35/Add.1 (Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter 2007Addendum Report].
132. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: FurtherSteps
Toward the Operationalizationof the "Protect,Respect and Remedy" Framework, 27,
U.N. Doc. AIHRC/14127 (Apr. 9, 2010) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter 2010 Further Steps
Report].
133. See CRC, supranote 122, 64.
134. Working with SOEs, supra note 116 (under the "Common Dilemma Scenarios" tab).
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international law for the internationally wrongful acts of
its SOEs if they can be considered State organs or are
acting on behalf, or under the orders, of the State....
Much the same is true of sovereign wealth funds and the
human rights impacts of their investments. 135
The SRSG noted increasing state activity in the investment sphere
and hinted at the possibility of an SWF investment in a corporation
committing human rights violations leading to state responsibility.
Accordingly, the SRSG did not consider only traditional public purpose
SOEs or SOEs operating internationally in human-rights-sensitive
fields under heightened human rights expectations. Instead, even
minimal investment activity was considered a possible source for
triggering state responsibility. 136 Consequently, the focus shifted from
SOEs as individual agents to a more comprehensive view on managing
the state-corporation relationship. The proposal made in CRC Comment
16, calling state-owned enterprises to assume a leadership position in
conducting children's-rights due diligence, resonates with this view. 137
Third, the instruments make a distinct attempt to define state
ownership in the context of overall state involvement in the market
sphere. The GCDF, for example, discussed the possibility of state
ownership being "used to support the human rights of citizens in a way
that goes beyond commercial considerations" in the market. 13s Likewise,
one of the SRSG's major points was that "the state's role as an economic
actor is a key-but under-utilized-leverage point in promoting
corporate human rights awareness and preventing abuses."' 39 This was
even more pronounced where the state itself was "involved in the
135. 2008 Framework Report, supra note 121, $ 32.
136. The relationship between SWF investments and human rights occasionally has
been discussed in the literature. For example, Van Der Zee has suggested that many
SWFs can be considered state organs and, consequently, have a higher responsibility to
protect human rights in their investments, despite their separate legal identity. See Van
Der Zee, supra note 95, at 147-48. Demeyre has contested this view, arguing that links of
attribution are too weak, tenuous and far removed to accommodate any "investment
liability responsibility" as a legal obligation. See Demeyre, supra note 63, at 207. Similar
discussions have also emerged in international investment law. See, e.g., M. Sornarajah,
Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Existing Structure of the Regulation of Investments, 1
ASIAN J. INT'L L. 267, 278-84 (2011); see also Paul Blyschak, State-Owned Enterprisesand
InternationalInvestment Treaties: When Are State-Owned Entities and Their Investments
Protected?, 6 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 1, 17-34 (2011). Nevertheless, the SRSG did
explicitly emphasize the ease of state attribution in SOE context. See 2008 Framework
Report, supra note 121, 32.
137. See CRC, supranote 122, 64.
138. Working with SOEs, supra note 116 (under the "What is the Dilemma?" tab).
139. 2010 FurtherSteps Report, supra note 132, 32.
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business venture - whether as owner, investor, insurer, procurer, or
simply promoter." 140 In this context, SOEs were discussed only as a
single forum for corporate human rights promotion. Especially in the
GPs, state ownership was considered to be only one aspect of the statebusiness nexus. 141 CRC Comment 16 reinforced this notion by
discussing the human rights potential of SOEs together with policies
such as "those provided by an export credit agency, development finance

and investment insurance

142
"....

In sum, the approach of the U.N. instruments to state ownership
was already mixed at the definitional level. Often, individual stateowned companies with their individual human rights perils and
potential formed the primary lens through which to examine state
ownership. Regardless, the instruments also made room for a more
functional perspective on state ownership. Most importantly, the U.N.
instruments clearly recognized changes in the modes of modern state
ownership and sought to approach new economic realities and new
forms of state shareholder power from a human rights perspective.
C. State Ownership as Peril
Each of the U.N. business and human rights governance
instruments is somehow rooted in the peril narrative. Most commonly,
the perils of state ownership appear either as detrimental economic
statecraft pursued by autocratic regimes or as overall inefficiency,
depriving resources from the human rights enterprise. Beyond that,
however, the peril narrative also is embodied by a more nuanced
interrogation of the actual activities of SOEs both domestically and
internationally.
The U.N. instruments ground the peril narrative in the
revitalization of state ownership. The SRSG's treatment discussed state
ownership already in the first report, which stressed that
ways must be found to engage State-owned enterprises
in addressing human rights challenges in their spheres
of operation. They are becoming increasingly important
players in some of the most troubling industry sectors
yet appear to operate beyond many of the external
sources of scrutiny to which commercial firms are
140. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: Towards
16, U.N. Doc.
Operationalizing the "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework,
AIHRC/ll/13 (Apr. 22, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Towards Report].
141. See 2011 GPs Report, supra note 126, at 9-10, 12.
142. CRC, supra note 122, 64.
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subject.

The rationale was that the growing influence of certain SOEs in
some industry sectors should be reflected in the supervision of their
human rights performance. 1 " It was further noted that SOEs often
operated beyond normal regulatory mechanisms.145
A similar approach continued in the SRSG's later reports. In 2007,
the SRSG claimed that "[e]vidence suggests that firms operating in only
one country and state-owned companies often are worse offenders than
146
their highly visible private sector transnational counterparts."
Additionally, SOEs from emerging economies, in particular, had not
associated themselves with voluntary CSR initiatives. 147 For the SRSG,
this was an indication of a "mounting concern in the public space about
148
human rights protection and State-owned enterprises."
In the GCDF, state ownership was framed by highlighting the
increasing importance of SOEs from emerging economies, leading to the
"emergence of state-owned TNCs [transnational corporations]." 149 CRC
Comment 16, however, did not reflect on the realities of the increasing
state-owned capital flows in a similar way. Instead, it focused on
inefficiencies associated with the mismanagement of government
revenues from state-owned businesses that, in turn, jeopardized
sufficient resource allocations for the realization of children's rights.15 0
Even though grounded in the increasing economic influence of state
ownership globally, the peril narrative emerged strongly in relation to
the domestic operations of SOEs. In particular, the SRSG and the
GCDF highlighted structural deficiencies of the state-owned sector.
Apart from the possibility of impunity, highlighted in the SRSG's
treatise, the skewed regulatory environment emerged as the chief
concern.151 SOEs were considered to be plagued by "having limited
143. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 120,

80.

144. Id.
145. Id.

146. 2007 MappingReport, supra note 130, T 3.
147. See id. 81; see also Rae Lindsay et al., Human Rights Responsibilities in the Oil
and Gas Sector: Applying the UN GuidingPrinciples,6 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 2, 3233 (2013).

148. 2007Addendum Report, supra note 131, 78.
149. Working with SOEs, supra note 116 (under the "What is the Dilemma?" tab); see,
e.g., id. (under the "Examples of Emerging Economy Scenarios" tab).
150. Compare CRC, supra note 122,
55, with CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, BUYING
SOCIAL JUSTICE: EQUALITY, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, & LEGAL CHANGE 115-28 (2007)

(discussing arguments against and in favor of linkage and government spending).
151. See 2006 Interim Report, supra note 120, 7 79-80 (discussing the policy
instruments available to states and external sources of scrutiny to which firms are
subject).
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accountability other than to their 'parent' governments" and limited
transparency concerning their activities, resulting in market
domination, favorable regulatory treatment, and substantial balance
sheets. 15 2 Accordingly, the perilous conduct of SOEs was aggravated by
their minimal need to respond to "outside pressure ... with respect to
15 3
their human rights performance."'
In sum, the peril narrative stood out strongly in the U.N.
instruments. The instruments, especially the Framework, the GPs, and
the GCDF, framed the perils of state ownership, embodied by SOEs, in
multiple ways. State ownership of the internationally-operating
corporations was revitalized, human rights treaty bodies were observed
to pay closer attention to SOEs, and the influence of states on SOEs in
regulatory and shareholder capacities was noted. SOEs were
particularly active in the human-rights-sensitive sectors; their influence
was increasing faster than that of MNEs; and they were not
participants in the same voluntary CSR schemes as private
corporations. There was mounting evidence of their adverse human
rights impacts. Simultaneously, SOEs often could evade public scrutiny,
enforcement, and market discipline in a way private MNEs could not.
Finally, it also was noted that state ownership was prone to
mismanagement of government revenues, leading to insufficient
resources devoted to the overall human rights enterprise.
D. State Ownership as Potential
The U.N. instruments, in general, note the growing economic
significance of state ownership in the global economy. Accordingly, they
also reflect on its potential for advancing the business and the human
rights agenda. In the SRSG's treatise, in particular, the overall
approach changed from peril to potential as the mandate progressed,
and state ownership started to emerge primarily as an instrument to
civilize corporate behavior using market mechanisms. Most
importantly, SOEs started to be seen as a group of corporations that
showed the greatest short-term promise in integrating human rights
considerations.
The move from peril to potential was already discernible in the
SRSG's 2008 report introducing the Framework. Here, state ownership
issues were grouped under the state's ability to influence corporate
cultures, and the SRSG suggested that engaging SOEs was different
from privately owned companies. The view was that "in principle,
152. Working with SOEs, supra note 116 (under the "Common Dilemma Scenarios" tab).
153. Id.
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inducing a rights-respecting corporate culture should be easier to
achieve in State-owned enterprises."' 154 This was because "[s]enior
management in SOEs is typically appointed by and reports to State
entities."155 CRC Comment 16 shared this view, calling states to "lead
by example, requiring all State-owned enterprises to undertake childrights due diligence and to publicly communicate their reports on their
156
impact on children's rights."'
The SRSG also noted that some states were already starting to push
policies for a greater "respect for human rights" in SOE operations. 15 7 In
this connection, the SRSG suggested that, in order to open up the
human rights potential of state ownership, one must realize that "the
state's role as an economic actor is a key-but under-utilized-leverage
point in promoting corporate human rights awareness and preventing
abuses." 5 8 Where the state was involved with any kind of commercial
entities, its human rights obligations and wide policy margin dictated
that additional, human-rights-based supervision was warranted. Thus,
SOEs as separate entities started to disappear from the SRSG's vision,
and state ownership was understood to be part of a greater set of
economic policy measures. 159
Elsewhere in the GPs, the SRSG again emphasized that state
ownership and control offered the most effective means to ensure that
relevant policies, legislation, and regulations regarding respect for
human rights were implemented. 160 CRC Comment 16 shared this view,
advising states to make "public support and services, such as those
provided by an export credit agency, development finance and
investment insurance conditional on businesses carrying out childrights due diligence."' 61 Its prescriptions, however, were more closely
embedded in the existing human rights treaty system and state
obligations than the SRSG's policy-coherence-influenced intervention.
CRC Comment 16 made this clear by stating that "States should not
invest public finances and other resources in business activities that
violate children's rights" as a part of their obligation to respect human

154. 2008 FrameworkReport, supra note 121, 1 32.
155. Id.
156. CRC, supra note 122, 64.
157. 2010 FurtherSteps Report, supra note 132, 1 28.
158. Id. 32.
159. See, e.g., 2011 GPs Report, supra note 126, at 9-10, 12; 2009 Towards Report, supra
note 140, 16.
160. See 2011 GPs Report, supra note 126, at 9-10 (discussing, in the Commentary to
Principle 4, that States have greater means within their powers when they own or control
business enterprises).
161. CRC, supranote 122, 64.
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rights.
Deviating from the GPs and CRC Comment 16, the GCDF probed
the mechanisms through which private MNEs were able to influence
SOEs. Because the GCDF focused primarily on the skewed market
conditions, the potential narrative was deployed from the perspective of
163
For example,
civilizing state ownership through market mechanisms.
use their
should
companies
private
the instrument emphasized that
in joint
place"
take
abuses
"no
that
shareholder leverage to make sure
164
the
recognize
however,
did,
GCDF
The
ventures with SOEs.
a
in
citizens
of
rights
human
the
possibility of "SOEs used to support
' 16 5
the
Furthermore,
considerations."
commercial
way that goes beyond
GCDF referred to a more general argument when it addressed the social
policy functions pursued by SOEs:
SOEs have been used in both developed and emerging
markets to promote broader societal goals, including
higher levels of employment, the avoidance of mass
layoffs in times of economic difficulty or the provision of
affordable food and energy to the local population.
Whilst this can make SOEs economically unsustainable
without government support - it can do much to further
166
a range of human rights.
In sum, the argumentation of the SRSG regarding state ownership
concentrated originally on SOEs and evolved from focusing on their
significance, their adverse human rights impacts, and the perceived
structural deficiencies in their regulation to their human rights
potential. The SRSG eventually discarded this approach toward SOEs
as individual companies with greater-than-average human rights

162. Id. 27; see also id. 26.
163. Compare Working with SOEs, supra note 116 (under the "Suggestions for
Responsible Business" tab), with Shapiro & Globerman, supra note 6, at 114-24, and
OECD, SOEs OperatingAbroad: An Application of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises to the Cross-Border Operations of SOEs I 4-9
(2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/20/44215438.pdf.
164. Working with SOEs, supra note 116 (under the "Suggestions for Responsible
Business" tab).
165. Id. (under the 'What is the Dilemma?" tab).
166. Id. (under the "Common Dilemma Scenarios" tab). In this connection, the GCDF

considered state ownership as a form of social policy taking human rights as its reference
point. Compare id., with Hans Christiansen, BALANCING COMMERCIAL AND NONCOMMERCIAL PRIORITIES OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 10-11 (OECD, Corporate
Governance Working Papers No. 6, 2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
5k4dkhztkp9r-en (last visited Jan 22, 2015).
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footprints and started to emphasize general state ownership as a
promising tool for promoting a business and human rights agenda. The
approach of CRC Comment 16 was more tightly focused on setting up
the actual parameters of using state wealth to secure realization of
states' human rights obligations under Convention on the Rights of the
Child. The GCDF, on the other hand, probed the conditions in which
private companies might be used to bring about better human rights
governance in SOE operations.
E. The Specialty of State Ownership
While the peril narrative emphasizes the detrimental qualities of
the power state holds over companies, the potential narrative seeks to
transform that influence to promote the business and human rights
agenda. In doing so, both narratives fall back on the special relationship
between state and SOEs as mediated by states' ownership function. In
the U.N. instruments, the specialty narrative operates on two different
levels. First, the specialty of state ownership is approached as a
question of public policy. Second, particularly the Framework and CRC
Comment 16 seek to translate the question of state ownership into a
more specific question of state responsibility under international law.
The SRSG's treatise, in particular, framed the specialty narrative
and was initially in extralegal vocabulary that emphasized policy
considerations. In the 2008 report introducing the Framework, for
example, the SRSG claimed that "[b]eyond any legal obligations, human
rights harm caused by SOEs reflects directly on the State's reputation,
providing it with an incentive in the national interest to exercise greater
oversight." 167 In later reports, the SRSG continued to underline the
"strong policy reasons for home States to encourage their companies to
respect rights abroad, especially if a State itself is involved in the
business venture." 168 Specifically, the SRSG made a strong connection
between sovereign wealth and human rights promotion, stating that
"the closer an entity is to the State, or the more it relies on statutory
authority or taxpayer support, the stronger is the State's policy
rationale for ensuring that the entity promotes respect for human
rights."16 9 As such, the initial basis for both detrimental and progressive
human rights impacts of state ownership sprung primarily from
domestic policy considerations.
However, the SRSG also pointed out that international law provided

167. 2008 Framework Report, supra note 121, 1 32.
168. 2009 Towards Report, supra note 140, 16.
169. 2010 FurtherSteps Report, supra note 132, 26.
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multiple avenues for triggering state responsibility over the actions of
an SOE. While the SRSG generally anchored the responsibility for
corporations' human rights violations in the state duty to protect
against human rights abuse by third parties, SOEs were discussed more
prominently with regard to the state duty to respect human rights and
attribution of human rights violations to the state. 170 Early on, the
SRSG emphasized that
States can also be found to breach the duty to respect if
State-owned or controlled enterprises or other
companies exercising public functions (in situations
where their acts may be attributed to the State) do not
policies
refrain from abuse or if the State has laws or
171
enterprises.
business
by
abuse
facilitate
which
While the discussion of state responsibility is, in general, slightly
ambiguous, when the SRSG addressed SOEs separately they were
clearly differentiated from private corporations. 172 In particular, the
SRSG stressed that
When the treaty bodies do discuss State-owned
enterprises, they hold States responsible for abuse
carried out by such enterprises even where the State
argues that it has minimum control over the enterprise's
daily decision-making. What is less clear is whether the
treaty bodies consider the State's responsibility to stem
from the duty to protect (in situations where the
enterprises may [sic] considered in the same way as
private businesses) or from the duty to respect (if Stateowned enterprises are considered State organs or
agents).173
The SRSG noted that it was not clear whether the source of this
responsibility lay primarily with the duty to respect or with the duty to

170. See 2007Addendum Report, supranote 131, at 2-3.
10.
171. Id.
172. In multiple reports, the SRSG hesitated in taking a firm position on attribution
78, 80; 2007
under human rights law. See 2007 Addendum Report, supra note 131,
Mapping Report, supra note 130, 81. For an overview of customary international law on
attribution, see BADIA, supra note 47, at 163-96; JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 161-65 (2013); Feit, supra note 53, at 144-68.
173. 2007Addendum Report, supranote 131, 79 (internal citation omitted).
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protect. 174 Ultimately, however, this distinction made no difference, as
it appears that the State is responsible for ensuring
State-owned enterprises do not abuse human rights,
either as part of the obligation to respect (if State-owned
enterprises are considered State organs) or as part of the
obligation to protect (if they are considered private
businesses).175
In CRC Comment 16, SOEs were grouped even more clearly under
the state obligation to respect human rights. While CRC Comment 16
did not refer to attribution, it made numerous references to the "State
as a whole, regardless of its internal structures [and decentralization of
power]"'176 and to companies acting as state agents. 177 Further, state-led
investment was framed as belonging under the obligation to respect
8
human rights.17
Even though the SRSG's treatise centered on the state duty to
protect human rights from third-party violations, SOEs also were
addressed under the second pillar of the Framework, the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights. Potential additional
responsibilities of SOEs were considered, especially in relation to
privatized state functions: "More than respect may be required when
companies perform certain public functions .... But it remains unclear
what the full range of those responsibilities might be and how they
relate to the State's ongoing obligation to ensure that the rights in
question are not diminished." 179 The SRSG also suggested that certain
corporations could be targeted with more extensive corporate human
rights obligations. 180 For example, the SRSG made several references to
SOEs performing limited public functions, claiming that SWFs and
174. This distinction has been noted to disrupt some core assumptions of the SRSG's
conceptualization. For example, Backer has argued that the SRSG's otherwise wellfunctioning division to conservative legalism of state duty to protect pillar and
overarching functionalism of corporate responsibility to respect pillar breaks down in the
case of entities that straddle the state-corporate divide. See Backer, supra note 118, at
164. In a more critical tone, Deva considers that the SRSG has created a conceptual
anarchy because concepts of "respect" and "protect" have been conflated. His critique
posits that, in the SOE context, the government would comply with its respect obligation
but not the protect obligation in ensuring that an SOE does not violate human rights. See
DEVA, supra note 124, at 110-11.
175. 2007 Addendum Report, supra note 131, t 80.
176. CRC, supra note 122, T 10.
177. See, e.g., id. TT 5, 8.
178. See id. TT 26-27.
179. 2009 Towards Report, supra note 140, T 64.
180. See id. T 89.
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export credit agencies (ECAs) were prone to human rights risks and
that they should monitor and control the human rights impacts of their
investments.' 8 ' Thus, at least some SOEs were clearly singled out as
entities having potential for heightened corporate responsibilities to
respect human rights under the second pillar in the early phase of the
mandate. The finalized GPs did not, however, continue on this track.
Instead, all enterprises were considered to have the same responsibility
regardless of ownership structures. 182 This line of reasoning persisted in
CRC Comment 16, but certain SOEs were still singled out. States were,
for example, advised to ensure
agencies ... such as export credit agencies, take steps to

identify, prevent and mitigate any adverse impacts the
projects they support might have on children's rights
before offering support to businesses operating abroad
and stipulate that such agencies will not support
to cause or contribute to
activities that are likely
183
children's rights abuses.
In the GPs, state ownership was ultimately discussed under the
rubric of the state duty to protect. The duty prescription was distilled in
Principle 4, "the State-business nexus":
States should take additional steps to protect against
human rights abuses by business enterprises that are
owned or controlled by the State, or that receive
substantial support and services from State agencies
such as export credit agencies and official investment
insurance or guarantee agencies, including, where
84
appropriate, by requiring human rights due diligence.
The commentary referred to states as the primary duty-bearers
under international human rights law and the proximity of a business
enterprise to the state. Further, state ownership and control also offered
the most effective means to ensure that relevant policies, legislation,
and regulations regarding respect for human rights were implemented,
181. See, e.g., 2008 Framework Report, supra note 121, 1 39 (considering an example of
the home State side).
182. Even in this context, the SRSG connects SOEs and the possibility of attribution.
See U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., The CorporateResponsibility to Respect
Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide 21-22, HR/PUB/12/02 (2012).
183. CRC, supra note 122, 45(c).
184. 2011 GPs Report, supra note 126, at 9.
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including that the senior management of SOEs report to the state
agencies and associated government departments that have greater
scope for scrutiny and oversight18l Accordingly, the SRSG argued that
states could and should influence corporations operating with statutory
authority, taxpayer support, or in other cases where they were closely
aligned with state functions.' 8 6 The human rights commitments of
states were to be made categorical when interacting with the market
through state ownership. However, the demand was not articulated in
legal terminology. Instead, the closer state involvement stemmed from
arguments of policy coherence. Despite the earlier emphasis on easier
attribution of SOE actions to the state, state responsibility was referred
8 7
to only in passing.
Overall, the specialty narrative focused little on state responsibility
for the activities of SOEs in the SRSG's agenda. While the GPs retained
the possibility that acts of state-owned companies could entail a
violation of states' own international law obligations, the possibility of
state attribution for SOE abuses was entertained mostly as an
additional argument for greater policy coherence. By contrast, CRC
Comment 16 was more explicit in tying state ownership to the existing
human rights treaty system. 88 Thus, using state ownership
instrumentally to nudge companies to being more sensitive toward their
human rights impacts was framed as part of the state obligation to
respect human rights and not as an ethically correct policy choice.
Despite their differences, all U.N. instruments turned to the "special
bond" between state shareholders and their investee companies. Most
importantly, each instrument attempted to translate the often abstract
coupling between universal human rights and domestically-drafted
ownership policies into legal language by discussing state responsibility
under customary international law or distinct human rights regimes.
With CRC Comment 16 being more optimistic and the GCDF, the
Framework, and the GPs being more skeptical, the instruments
nevertheless attempted to make sense of both the perils and the
potentials of state ownership by embedding it in the specialty narrative,
either through policy argumentation or through state responsibility
frameworks provided by international law.
F. Summing Up the U.N. Experience
The U.N. instruments portray an interesting vision of state
185.
186.
187.
188.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 9-10.
See CRC, supra note 122,

26-27.
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ownership. Of these three instruments, the approach of the SRSG on
state ownership showed the greatest variation and exposed state
ownership to the greatest variety of human-rights-relevant factors. CRC
Comment 16, on the other hand, connected state ownership more
concretely with the existing human rights treaty system and made a
stronger case for the far-reaching duties of state ownership to achieve
positive human rights ends. The practical focus of the GCDF exposed
state ownership particularly well to its market-based critiques. Despite
their differences, all three instruments connect state ownership and
human rights through three distinct narratives. While none of the
narratives explored here is discrete or clearly delineated, taken together
they open up a human rights dimension in state ownership and
illuminate the ways this dimension ought to be utilized as a regulatory
space.
The peril narrative unfolds in a way that reflects the traditional
critiques mounted against state ownership. In this narrative, state
ownership is linked to the convolution of political and commercial
agendas, private rent-seeking, cumbersome bureaucratic structures,
and the privileged position of SOEs vis-A-vis private market
participants. The U.N. instruments clearly connect these critiques to
the business and human rights agenda and explore their practical
consequences such as impunity, low interest in CSR, and suboptimal
allocation of scarce resources.
The potential narrative stands out when states are advised to use
corporate law structures in a shareholder capacity to promote corporate
respect for human rights. In particular, the discussion on the special
status of SOEs, the investment policies, and other wealth transfers
through ECAs and SWFs connects state shareholder power with human
rights promotion. CRC Comment 16 is the most explicit in this regard.
According to CRC Comment 16, SOEs are expected to assume a position
of leadership when it comes to conducting human rights due diligence.
Accordingly, state shareholder power, as embedded in other humanrights-sensitive economic tools and policies, is portrayed as an effective
space for human rights governance.
The specialty narrative is the most elusive of the three. It touches
on both the peril and the potential narratives and is a primary vehicle
for making the connection between state ownership and human rights
in international law. While most potent in discussions of domestic policy
and the responsible use of sovereign wealth, the specialty narrative also
attempts the coupling between state responsibility and state ownership
under international law. Here, the instruments take different routes. In
the final vision of the Framework and the GPs, the specialty of state
ownership is downplayed. Attempts to use sovereign wealth as leverage
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is not motivated by the legal obligations of states under human rights
law. Rather, the reasons for heightened duties stem from policy
coherence and the avoidance of reputational risks. 8 9 While the GCDF
shares the vision of the Framework and the GPs on the difficulties of
triggering state responsibility, CRC Comment 16 is more willing to
include state ownership in the general human rights duties imposed on
states. The specialty narrative warrants a separate discussion precisely
because of the coupling it makes between the human rights duties of
states and the immense power that state shareholders command.
Beyond exposing state ownership as a governance space with
pervasive, and so far undertheorized, human rights ramifications, the
U.N. experience offers a vision of the regulatory techniques for the
future. In particular, the ways in which U.N. instruments portray state
ownership through perils, potentials, and specialty make significant use
of private market mechanisms. In the peril narrative, the view of state
ownership as an instrumentality of waste and oppression pays homage
to the traditional critiques of state ownership focusing on the privileged
position of SOEs in the market. In the potential narrative, the civilizing
touch of the state is sought in the power of the state shareholder and of
Western companies to gain leverage over SOEs from autocratic regimes.
In the specialty narrative, the responsible use of sovereign wealth and
the possibility of state responsibility are used to portray state ownership
as a functionally-oriented tool for human rights governance.
As such, the market-based model preferred by the U.N. instruments
reflects a more constitutive development where other bodies of law are
increasingly exposed to the demands rising from the human rights
system. As the pinnacle of this process, the U.N. business and human
rights agenda seeks to integrate human rights considerations into the
full range of economic law and policy discourses spanning corporate law,
investment law, labor law, consumer protection, and many others. 190
State ownership embodies these developments because it causes states'
market operations to be permeated by human rights ends. At the same
time, however, the nascent human-rights-based regulation of state
ownership also suggests a regulatory strategy that is not fundamentally
different from more established regimes featuring the use of state
189. The SRSG's narrow view both on law and legal responsibility and corresponding
emphasis on policy arguments has been noted in various contexts including home state
responsibility, direct human rights obligations of corporations, and limited approach to
application of extraterritorial jurisdiction. See Daniel Augenstein & David Kinley, When
Human Rights 'Responsibilities' Become 'Duties.- The Extra-Territorial Obligations of
States that Bind Corporations,in HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 271, 275-80, 291-94 (Surya Deva & David
Bilchitz eds., 2013).
190. See RUGGIE, supra note 111.
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shareholder power. Instead, the U.N. experience may offer a vision of
the future where realization of human rights is best sought by
strategically attaching public ends to markedly private arrangements in
the global markets.
CONCLUSION: STATE OWNERSHIP,

HUMAN

RIGHTS, AND THE TURN TO

MARKET

State ownership and human rights can be coupled in a number of
ways. At one end of the spectrum, human rights may illuminate the
deficiencies in the ways states use their wealth. State ownership might
reveal the appropriation of national wealth by a small elite group,
expose failures of the rule of law, and enable states to export their
abusive policy preferences abroad. At the other end, the coupling is
presented as a continuation of the developmental state model where
state ownership, channeled through the investee companies, appears as
a vehicle for the realization of human rights. Rendered acute by the rise
of globally-oriented state ownership, these opposite positions surface
across the international legal and policy discourses as narratives
detailing the perils and potentials of state ownership. The coupling
between state ownership and human rights is further operationalized by
the specialty narrative interrogating the basis of, and limits on, the
responsible use of the sovereign wealth tied to corporate equities.
Historically, human rights law has not been utilized effectively in
controlling the use of state shareholder power. Following the overall
turn to human rights in international corporate regulation, recent U.N.
instruments do, however, recognize the peril and potential of state
ownership for the realization of human rights. In the peril narrative,
state ownership appears as impunity, privilege, and misallocation of
scarce resources. In the potential narrative, state ownership stands for
a flexible use of private governance mechanisms to civilize corporate
conduct regardless of territorial jurisdiction. While differing in their
view on the specialty of state ownership, the U.N. instruments ground
the responsible use of sovereign wealth in the international human
rights system. In its weakest form, state ownership is discussed in
terms of reputation and policy coherence. In its strongest interpretation,
human-rights-sensitive state ownership takes the form of a legal
obligation grounded in the state duty to respect human rights. In each
case, however, the economic power of state shareholders appears as a
human rights space. Importantly, this regulatory space has dimensions
beyond the most vocally raised human rights concerns such as
protection of private property against state actions, as displayed in
much of international arbitration involving SOEs.
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Concomitant with the evolution of SOEs in the global economy, the
U.N. human rights governance instruments clearly recognize the
significance of state ownership and its contemporary institutional
arrangements. They depart from the traditional paradigm case, a
wholly-owned state company, and view the current forms of
internationalized state ownership as functional and flexible regulatory
spaces. Most importantly, the U.N. instruments approach this
regulatory space with a focus on private market transactions.
Embodying the calls for states to "use their power, as owners and
operators of SOEs, to control the tools of transnational economic
ordering to enhance a new social corporate law," 191 to utilize the market
in exporting rule of law, 192 or to use the purchasing power of the state to
pursue social ends, 193 the U.N. instruments portray the market sphere
as a site for civilizing the ways in which states own corporations. In the
peril narrative, the market sphere mediates the leverage of private
companies in civilizing privileged SOEs. In the potential narrative, state
shareholders employ the market sphere by using their formal control
rights to introduce human-rights-sensitive policies in corporate
operations.
Consistent with modern state ownership structures being framed as
functionally separate and institutionally independent from the "visible
hand" of the government, the U.N. instruments' preference for marketbased governance also exposes a general turn to private techniques in
modern human rights governance. To some, adopting techniques that
seek to further the realization of human rights in the market risks the
subordination of social values to market logic. To others, the market
represents an underutilized regulatory space that is capable of
adjusting economic logic toward gaining better social outcomes. Based
on the experience with state ownership in recent governance
instruments, the U.N. human rights enterprise appears firmly
embedded in the latter category. Whether it is exposing abusive SOEs to
the market discipline of private actors or recalibrating sovereign
investment in order to make private companies more sensitive to
human rights claims, the contemporary U.N. human rights system
views state ownership as a governance space where private shareholder
power makes the greatest difference.
Ultimately, there are two key lessons to be drawn from the recent
U.N. experience with state ownership. First, in an era when the U.N. is
often sidelined as a key institution of international economic
governance, the efforts of its human rights institutions to regulate and
191. Muchlinski, supra note 94, at 705.
192. See Backer, supra note 68, at 5--6.
193. See, e.g., MCCRUDDEN, supra note 150.
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define terms of state ownership policies signal a subtle rejuvenation of
the United Nations as a meaningful forum. By imprinting international
human rights ends onto domestic economic policies, the United Nations,
and its human rights system in particular, demonstrates willingness to
utilize emerging cracks and fissures in the global economic governance
for broader institutional gain. Second, the preference for market-based
techniques suggests an attempt to reclaim globalized and financialized
markets to serve economic justice. The rise of globally-oriented state
ownership has, at least momentarily, provided an opportunity to revisit
and reconsider some of the key theoretical underpinnings of
contemporary economic governance. Sensitive to changes in the
architecture of state ownership and in the global economy, the U.N.
instruments have primarily used this discursive space to embed states'
shareholder power into human rights governance and to recalibrate
19 4
As such, the
private shareholder identity to align with public ends.
U.N. experience with state ownership may be indicative of a more
constitutive shift in the ways the human rights impacts of corporate
activity, or any economic activity, are approached in the future.

194. Compare this with the concept of "publicization" introduced in Jody Freeman,
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1285-90
(2003).

